The one about context…

October 9, 2008

Positivist theories derive from the rational, empirical, scientific tradition.  And phenomenological theories, in contrast to the objective and quantitative nature of positivist theories, are subjective and qualitative in nature (Dourish, 20).

These two broad categories of reasoning help to approach the issue of context-aware computing by framing the opposing viewpoints of what context is.

The positivist account of context can be said to define the problem as one of representation. Software systems are representational, so thinking of context leads into the issue of how context can be encoded and represented (21).

I take this to mean that in order to classify context, and subsequently create computer systems capable of determining one’s context, a programmer would have to be able to codify the random, chaotic nature of reality into data.

So from a  positivist viewpoint context can be characterized by these 4 principles:

- Context is a form of information.
- Context is delineable.
- Context is stable.
- Context and activity are separable.

But from a phenomenological viewpoint context is characterized by these 4 principles:

- Contextuality is a relational property that holds between objects or activities.
- The scope of contextual features is defined dynamically.
- Context is an occasional property, relevant to particular settings, instances of action and parties to that action.
- Context arises from the activity.

Dourish argues that in order to understand context, one must not approach it as a representational problem but rather as an interactional problem.  I find this approach to be much more applicable as it suggests that context cannot be a stable, external description of the setting in which activity arises but rather it arises from and is sustained by the activity itself.  (23)  In order to fully grasp the context one must understand how their presence affects the situation, in other words be an internal element of the situation.

Advertisement

Leave a Reply

Fill in your details below or click an icon to log in:

WordPress.com Logo

You are commenting using your WordPress.com account. Log Out / Change )

Twitter picture

You are commenting using your Twitter account. Log Out / Change )

Facebook photo

You are commenting using your Facebook account. Log Out / Change )

Connecting to %s

Follow

Get every new post delivered to your Inbox.